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Can Smart Contracts Enhance Firm 
Efficiency in Emerging Markets? 
Kevin J. Fandl, J.D., Ph.D.* 
Abstract: 
Blockchain technology has the potential to eliminate one of the most significant 
barriers to economic growth through private business transactions in developing 
countries—lack of trust. In a typical developed country, individuals and firms 
conduct transactions within an institutional environment that offers security 
through the enforcement of agreements. Transparent and effective courts, while 
imperfect to be sure, enable parties to feel secure in their transactions even if 
their level of trust in the other party is low. This security, in turn, facilitates 
transactions far afield from high-trust relationships (e.g., immediate relatives), 
generating transactions based upon economic value rather than party trust alone. 
Developing countries often lack effective or transparent institutions and are 
frequently plagued with corruption that weakens substantially their level of 
security in economic transactions. Accordingly, individuals and firms in 
developing countries seek contracting parties whom they trust, knowing that it is 
trust that will ensure enforcement more than courts or law enforcement. 
Transactions in this type of environment are thus limited to known entities, such 
as relatives or colleagues who have a trust-relationship with the individual. As a 
result, potentially valuable transactions are avoided due to lack of trust, which, 
on a macro-level, limits the economic growth potential of the entire economy. 
Blockchain technology and smart contracts offer a solution to the trust problem 
prevalent in developing country contractual transactions. First, because 
blockchain uses an open architecture, all transactions are publicly accessible, 
immutable, and verifiable by anyone. This helps to eliminate corruption and fraud 
from the transaction. Second, because all smart contract transactions are 
recorded along a blockchain and cannot be modified ex post, a permanent and 
publicly accessible ledger is available to shed any doubt about payments or other 
transactions throughout the process. And third, because blockchain systems are 
automated, security in the enforcement mechanism is all but guaranteed. For 
instance, failure to deliver goods by a set time will automatically trigger a default 
clause that transmits payment of liquidated damages to the injured party without 
the intervention of a judge or arbitrator. 
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(Lock Haven University), is an Associate Professor of Legal Studies and Strategic Global 
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Numerous problems with this approach exist. For instance, access to information 
about technology such as blockchain, especially among firms that would most 
directly benefit from it (e.g., informal firms), is highly limited for the moment. 
Second, smart contracts are in their infancy and work primarily with clearly 
stipulated terms that allow for no interpretation, which are not always common 
in contracts between firms. In this case, eliminating a neutral arbiter from the 
transaction also eliminates the possibility of reviewing the circumstances of a 
breach or other contract mishap. And third, though lack of trust in parties may 
be reduced through this technology, lack of trust in online financial transactions 
may be exacerbated. The use of electronic finance options in developing countries 
is far less common than in developed countries, making implementation of a 
completely online transmission system particularly challenging. 
Despite the evident weaknesses in applying smart contracts and blockchain 
technology to developing country firm transactions, there is great potential for at 
least small-scale application in certain markets where party trust levels are 
particularly low. In this paper, I will review literature on the development of 
smart contract technology and its application in relevant contexts. I will consider 
the potential impact that this technology could have if properly implemented in 
emerging markets. And I will offer a set of suggestions for policymakers to 
consider in educating firms and incentivizing their use of this technology. What 
follows is an introduction to the area of smart contracts as a substitute or at least 
a complement to legal institutions. I fully expect a robust literature to develop 
around this topic in the near future. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Contracts are one of the key tools in existence to enable the conduct of 
business.1 Long before the present-day concept of a legal contract was 
codified by statute or, in the case of common law, precedent, merchants relied 
on the premise of offer and acceptance to transact business.2 Enforcement of 
contracts historically rested with merchant communities and, in larger or 
more serious cases, with the ruling family.3 Today, enforcement power has 
shifted to courts and similar legal institutions. Without that power of 
enforcement, a contract was nothing more than a promise.4 
Just as a contract is at the heart of a business transaction, effective 
contract enforcement is at the heart of economic growth and development.5 
Long-distance trade, especially between unfamiliar parties, depends on trust 
in the institutions in existence to enforce the terms of the contract. This trust 
replaces what historically only existed between family members and what, 
therefore, largely limited the scope of trade.6 
The importance of trust in trade cannot be overstated.7 Merchants of the 
past engaged in transactions with those parties whom they knew or whom 
their associates vouched for.8 Merchant guilds, tribes, and families built 
reputations that enabled them to transact business on the basis of those 
                                                          
 1 See generally Larry DiMatteo, Law as a Source of Strategic Advantage: Strategic 
Contracting: Contract Law as a Source of Competitive Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 727, 732 
(2010) (discussing the importance of the contract as a mechanism for conducting business). 
 2 Leon E. Trakman, The Twenty-First-Century Law Merchant, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 775, 
784-785 (2011) (explaining the similarities between historical merchant transactions and 
modern-day institutions). 
 3 See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 273 (1778) 
(discussing the jurisdictional limitations in the application of the lex mercatoria). 
 4 See, e.g., Philip M. Nichols, Legal Theory of Emerging Economies, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 
229, 275-277 (1999) (discussing the distinctions between relational and formal contract 
settings, in which institutions play a leading role). 
 5 See generally Michael Trebilcock & Jing Leng, Contemporary Political Theory and 
Private Law: The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement in Economic Development, 
92 VA. L. REV. 1517 (2006) (providing a comprehensive examination of formal and informal 
contract law enforcement and proposing that both could serve as effective substitutes for 
formal legal institutions). 
 6 For an overview of “relational contracts,” see Ian Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: 
Challenges and Queries, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 877, 892-895 (2000). 
 7 For a comprehensive overview of the importance of trust in business transactions, see 
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY (1996). 
 8 Paul R. Milgrom, Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, The Role of Institutions in 
the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 ECON. 
& POL. 1, 2 (1990) (assessing the importance of trust and reputation in conducting business 
transactions in the absence of legal institutions); see also Anjanette H. Raymond, 
Confidentiality in a Forum of Last Resort: Is the Use of Confidential Arbitration a Good Idea 
for Business and Society?, 16 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 479, 506 (2005) (“Lex mercatoria utilizes 
reputation as a vital indicator of an individual’s standing within the commercial community. 
The impact on the reputation of a party is sometimes considered a more effective deterrent 
than the judicial process.”). 
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reputations. However, outsiders were rarely given the opportunity to engage 
in anything more than petty trade with these communities since they had no 
reputation to which the communities could look to for security.9 
Merchant laws and enforcement techniques evolved into modern-day 
business laws, courts and arbitral bodies.10 In developed countries today, 
courts serve the role of guarantor to enable transactions to occur between 
parties when the level of trust is insufficient alone. Failure by one party to 
abide by the promises made to another leads to court intervention rather than 
physical violence or excommunication from a given community as may have 
happened in the past. 
The trust that results from institutions operates on the premise that the 
institutions are themselves effective. A corrupt system of courts in which 
bribery more than justice drives decisions renders institutions ineffective and 
eliminates the guarantor of trust.11 A court system that has no enforcement 
mechanism due to under-resourced law enforcement authorities makes legal 
decisions paper tigers.12 And slow, bureaucratic and complex legal systems 
limit access to justice to those few able to navigate and expedite its 
resolutions. 
Many emerging markets today suffer from one or more of these 
dilemmas. Corruption, ineffective enforcement, and bureaucracy can deprive 
parties of the institutional guarantees that underlie transactions in developed 
countries. Without effective institutions, parties are left to rely upon the 
traditional notion of trust in the other party. Since there is no guarantee of 
enforcement or the means to protect the nature of the transaction, lack of trust 
will serve as a deterrent to entry into certain types of contracts. 
Contracts are built on trust. Institutions provide that trust in the absence 
of party familiarity and reputation. The strength of the institutions may 
indeed drive economic development through the creation of a trust 
environment that enables parties to take more risks in their business deals.13 
                                                          
 9 See, e.g., Roberta Dessi & Salvatore Piccolo, Merchant Guilds, Taxation and Social 
Capital 11 (Toulouse Sch. of Econ., Working Paper No. TSE-581, 2015) (describing the 
limited access for outsiders to local merchant communities and highlighting the evolution of 
foreign merchant guilds). 
 10 See, e.g., Leon E. Trakman, The Twenty-First-Century Law Merchant, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 
775, 792-93 (2011) (describing the evolution of merchant law into modern law). 
 11 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & Anna S. Tarassova, Institutional Reform in Transition: A 
Case Study of Russia, 10 S. CT. ECON. REV. 211, 232-33 (2002) (showing a bi-directional 
relationship between corruption and weak institutions); Toke S. Aidt, Corruption, Institutions, 
and Economic Development, 25 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 271, 271-72 (2009) (discussing 
the negative perception of business managers about corrupt institutional environments). 
 12 Joel P. Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the International 
Economic Organization: Toward Comparative Institutional Analysis, 17 NW J. INT’L L. & 
BUS. 470, 526 (1996) (explaining that “no institution is an island” and that institutions exist 
within a broader context, affected by governance and public policy). 
 13 Daniel Berkowitz, Johannes Moenius & Katharina Pistor, Legal Institutions and 
International Trade Flows, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 163, 172 (2004) (finding that the strength of 
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But when there is neither trust nor adequate institutions, the ability to enter 
those deals, and thus the ability to contribute to economic development in a 
trust-environment is substantially weakened. 
In this short paper, I will take a first step in trying to understand how 
low-trust environments limit opportunities for economic growth and 
development in emerging markets, and I will examine how the advent of 
blockchain technology—specifically smart contracts—might strengthen that 
trust environment in the absence of effective institutions. The paper is broken 
down into three sections. First, I will describe the problem of doing business 
in low-trust environments and the role that institutions play in circumventing 
the trust problem. Second, I will provide a foundational overview of 
blockchain technology and smart contracts in the context of generating trust. 
And finally, I will apply these ideas to the economic development context to 
generate discussion and further research about useful applications in the 
future. 
II. TRUST: THE FOUNDATION FOR DOING BUSINESS 
A. The Basis for Contracts 
To address the issue of how contracts underlie business, and how trust 
necessarily informs the effectiveness of those contracts, we must begin at the 
beginning with an examination of the contract itself. It is important at the 
outset to bear in mind that different jurisdictions across the world view 
contracts distinctly, yet all spring from a similar origin.14 In the majority of 
the world, which follow civil law precepts, contracts are identified by 
compliance with certain statutory requirements known to the parties. In the 
common law world, though statutes such as the Uniform Commercial Code 
provide some guidance to parties, most contractual arrangements arise based 
upon party interactions and intent. Given these different interpretations of 
contracts, our first question must necessarily be, what is a contract? 
A simple definition for a contract might be a legally enforceable 
promise. But that is a far cry from the intricacies of contracts in both civil 
and common law systems. The common law’s Restatement of Contracts 
defines a contract as, “A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the 
breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law 
in some way recognizes as a duty.”15 Civil law differs in that it lays out 
certain elements of proper contract formation, including free and informed 
consent, capacity to contract, and lawful object and purpose.16 
                                                          
legal institutions determine key economic indicators, such as levels of international trade). 
 14 See Kevin J. Fandl, Cross-Border Commercial Contracts and Consideration, 34 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1 (2016). 
 15 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
 16 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [[CIVIL CODE] art. 1108 (Fr.); but see id. at art. 1128 (revising the 
French civil code to eliminate the requirement for lawful cause); Solene Rowan, The New 
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In both instances, the goal is to distinguish mere promises from those 
promises for which parties can look to the law to provide remedies in the 
event of breach. The Latin term nudum pactum refers to a set of promises 
that are not enforceable by law. An unenforceable promise, for instance, 
might include the promise to gift an object to another party.17 Lack of 
consideration would make such a promise unenforceable in common law 
jurisdictions, though civil law jurisdictions would permit it if it was 
accompanied by a notarial document.18 Similarly, a set of promises for which 
no evidence can be provided to prove their existence would be considered by 
both jurisdictions as unenforceable.19 
While the civil law adhered to the concept of pacta sunt servanda, 
meaning that a person must perform their legal obligations, the common law 
maintained a more formless system for creating contracts, leaving much in 
the hands of the judges to interpret party interactions.20 This has led to some 
differing determinations about which promises to enforce and which to leave 
in the hands of the parties making the promises.21 Yet the foundation in both 
systems of contract law is the making of the promise and the intent to be 
bound by that promise. 
Making a promise to perform some obligation necessarily involves 
risk.22 Whether the promise is to deliver a container of luxury goods to a 
given destination by a set date or to pay for your meal at a fast food restaurant, 
the obligation being made by both parties involves an element of risk— 
namely, risk that the counterparty will fail to fully or properly perform their 
obligation under the agreement. This risk is mitigated principally by one 
concept—trust.23 
“By making a promise, a person invites another to trust, and to break a 
promise is to abuse that trust.”24 
The need for certain promises to be trustworthy is a reason why the 
law should enforce them. Contract law fortifies trust insofar as it 
provides grounds for confidence that another will perform a promise. 
                                                          
French Law of Contract, 66 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 805, 814 (2017). 
 17 See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 
85 CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1997). 
 18 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 931-32 (Fr.). 
 19 See, e.g., Statute of Frauds 1677, 29 Car. 2 (Eng.). 
 20 See, e.g., Arthur von Mehren, The French Civil Code and Contract: A Comparative 
Analysis of Formation and Form, 15 LA. L. REV. 687, 698-710 (1955) (providing a historical 
analysis of the development of common and civil law contract systems). 
 21 See, e.g., Fandl, supra note 14 at 111-12 (discussing the distinctions between common 
and civil law contracts during the early formation of contact law). 
 22 Alex Y. Seita, Uncertainty and Contract Law, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 120-21 (1984) 
(describing the transaction costs associated with contract formation). 
 23 Ethan J. Leib, Contracts and Friendships, 59 EMORY L.J. 649, 656-57 (2010) 
(describing the relational trust aspects of effective contract formation). 
 24 Anthony J. Bellia, Promises, Trust, and Contract Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 25, 25 (2002). 
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If the law renders a certain promise enforceable, a person may trust 
(have good grounds for confidence) that it will be performed. A 
degree of trust in certain promises is necessary, contract theorists say, 
for the realization of the goods that each asserts justifies a law of 
contract.25 
Certain types of promises undoubtedly require more trust.26 For 
instance, a promise to provide a cup of coffee in exchange for five dollars 
would require minimal trust between the consumer and the coffee vendor; 
however, a promise to ship a container of luxury goods from Los Angeles to 
Shanghai between two unrelated first-time business partners would require 
substantial trust. The risk in the latter transaction is exceedingly high due to 
the variety of unknowns, including the reputation of the party, the financial 
position of the party, and the financial commitment. 
Many of the risks that we face in contracting appear to be mitigated by 
the creation of binding documents, such as letters of credit, commitment 
letters, and the contract itself. However, without an effective and reliable 
institution to enforce those documents, they are nothing more than paper. For 
this reason, it is essential to examine the institutional environment and its 
own inherent risks in generating a sense of trust. 
B. Institutions and Trust 
Nobel Laureate Douglass North told us in 1991 that “[i]nstitutions are 
the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social 
interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, 
customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, 
laws, property rights).”27 According to North, institutions serve to reduce the 
transaction costs associated with human interactions. In particular, he 
explains that the importance of institutions arose along with the expansion of 
trade. As early traders began to engage in more long-distance ventures, 
reliable institutions (both informal and formal) were necessary to provide 
security in the transaction.28 
The institutions that North spoke about track the historical nature of 
societal structure—commonly agreed upon rules are established; a body is 
organized to interpret and apply those rules; another body is created to 
enforce punishments for violating those rules. In a modern society, we might 
see these as laws, courts and arbitrators, and law enforcement. But, at least 
according to North, these institutions are essential to economic development: 
“the inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of 
contracts is the most important source of both historical stagnation and 
                                                          
 25 Id. at 27. 
 26 See generally Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L. J. 1457 (2005) (providing a 
comprehensive overview of the legal concept of trust and its impact on institutions). 
 27 Douglass C. North, Institutions, 6 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 97 (1991). 
 28 Id. at 99-100. 
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contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World.”29 
The definition of an “institution” for purposes of this discussion 
includes both informal and formal legal constraints meant to restrict an 
individual’s actions and protect their interests.30 Laws are a prime example 
of institutions as they delineate the actions that a party can or cannot take and 
prescribe punishments for actions taken outside those constraints. The 
equivalent informal constraint would be best practices, morals, and 
community value systems that serve the same purpose as laws.31 
There are a host of problems with this approach. First, jurisdiction poses 
a substantial problem as laws generally have only domestic application and 
law enforcement lacks extraterritorial power.32 Thus, while parties to a 
contractual transaction in Philadelphia and New York may find comfort in 
the legal institutions that govern their engagement, a transaction between 
parties in Philadelphia and Bogotá33 will be far less assuring. A number of 
mechanisms have arisen to try to build the necessary institutional 
environment around cross-jurisdictional transactions, including arbitration, 
international treaties, and diplomacy.34 However, for a party operating in an 
efficient institutional environment, none of these mechanisms effectively 
substitutes the comfort that a party has in their domestic legal system. 
Second, in order for institutions to be effective, they must be 
transparent, just, and accessible.35 In much of the world, institutions lack 
                                                          
 29 DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 54 (1990). 
 30 Julio Faundez, Douglass North’s Theory of Institutions: Lessons for Law and 
Development, 8 HAGUE J. RULE L. 373, 385 (2016). 
 31 See Kevin J. Fandl, The Role of Informal Legal Institutions in Economic Development, 
32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1, 10-12 (2008) (describing the nature of informal legal systems and 
constraints); Francis Fukuyama, Address at the IMF Conference on Second Generation 
Reforms: Social Capital and Civil Society (Oct. 1, 1999), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs 
/ft/seminar/1999/reforms/fukuyama.htm (highlighting the importance of informal legal norms 
in modern economies). 
 32 See generally Phillip Wm. Lear & Blake D. Miller, Exhaustion of Tribal Court 
Remedies: Rejecting Bright-Line Rules and Affirmative Action, 71 N.D. L. REV. 277, 308-309 
(1995) (stipulating that extraterritorial enforcement of contract law is a matter generally left 
to treaty law). 
 33 Legal institutions in Colombia and much of Latin America are generally considered 
untrustworthy by business professionals. See, e.g., INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, 
BETTER SPENDING FOR BETTER LIVES: HOW LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN CAN DO 
MORE WITH LESS, (Alejandro Izquierdo, et al. eds, 2018) (discussing the effects of declining 
trust in communities and institutions in Latin America), https://flagships.iadb.org/ 
en/DIA2018/Better-Spending-for-Better-Lives. 
 34 See generally Larry A. DiMatteo, Lucien Dhooge, Stephanie Greene, Virginia Maurer, 
& Marisa Pagnattaro, The Interpretive Turn in International Sales Law: An Analysis of Fifteen 
Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 299 (2004) (examining a number of 
remedies utilized in international sales contracts). 
 35 See Clifton Johnson, General Counsel of Int’l Develop. L. Org., Address at 
International Scientific Conference: “The development of the Court Administration: 
directions and model”: Enhancing Judicial Transparency and Promoting Public Trust (June 
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these qualities, either due to corruption or bureaucratic inefficiency. 
Arbitration functions as a suitable substitute for effective courts; however, 
enforcement mechanisms continue to fall within the sphere of the state, 
meaning that even if an effective judgment can be attained, enforcing that 
judgment often poses the same problems inherent in the court system itself. 
In these jurisdictions, informal mechanisms such as reputational trust, often 
combined with the threat of violence, can serve as a more effective avenue 
to create constraints on the parties.36 
Third, access to institutions—even the most effective ones—comes at a 
financial cost. Though court access is usually a minimal financial burden, 
effective legal counsel can add significant expense to a transaction. Similarly, 
the use of arbitral mechanisms, which are often private, can generate 
substantial costs. These costs may limit the options of parties to lower-value 
transactions that could potentially lose more by seeking resolution than they 
lost as a result of the bad behavior of their counterparty. 
Though many other limitations exist, we can take these three as 
indicative of the larger problem of institutions, whether formal or informal. 
Reliance on institutions as a source of trust in a transaction adds risk, cost, 
and unpredictability. In effect, though institutions offer security to many 
transactions and generate a sense of trust amongst parties that may in itself 
promote good behavior, an institution is a third-party that is joining the 
transaction, and that third-party can weaken, just as easily as it can 
strengthen, the trust between parties. 
III. BLOCKCHAIN AND THE MANUFACTURING OF TRUST 
A. Trust Environments 
In a low-trust environment, reputation is everything. Without a positive 
reputation, and the necessary contacts to go along with that reputation, there 
is little chance of broad economic growth through expansive business 
transactions. Commercial activity will be limited to small circles of trust that 
largely exclude outside, unknown relationships that may be beneficial to both 
parties.37 These low-trust environments create a clan-based mentality that 
restricts opportunity. 
If a covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties perform 
presently, but trust one another; in the condition of mere nature (which 
                                                          
28, 2018), https://www.idlo.int/news/speeches-and-advocacy/enhancing-judicial-
transparency-and-promoting-public-trust. 
 36 Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 359, 
360 (1994) (“Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human 
interaction.”). 
 37 John Helliwell, Economic Growth and Social Capital in Asia 15-16 (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5470, 1996) (finding that higher levels of societal trust 
yield stronger economic performance). 
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is a condition of war of every man against every man,) upon any 
reasonable suspicion, it is void: but if there be a common power set 
over them both, with right and force sufficient to compel performance, 
it is not void. For he that performeth first, has no assurance the other 
will perform after, because the bonds of words are too weak to bridle 
men’s ambition, avarice, anger, and other passions, without the fear 
of some coercive power . . . . 
But in a civil estate, where there a power set up to constrain those that 
would otherwise violate their faith . . . he which by the covenant is to 
perform first, is obliged so to do.38 
As discussed above, the advent of institutions has helped tremendously 
to overcome the limitations of this clan-based mentality. Institutions provide 
the foundation for providing security in low-trust environments, promising 
the same type of protections that would be afforded in a high-trust 
environment. They substitute rules and consequences for reputation, 
leveraging the resources of a government or similar body to provide the 
parties with confidence that their relationship can proceed even in the 
absence of trust. 
[T]rust represents the ‘‘key building block of society” and thus also 
plays an essential role for the formation of interactions and 
relationships in the context of peer-to-peer marketplaces and services. 
For example, renting out an apartment on Airbnb does not only require 
hosts to trust potential guests to behave in a considerate and respectful 
manner (toward both the host and the apartment) but also to trust in 
Airbnb’s ability, integrity, and benevolence with regard to booking 
and payment processes. Also guests heavily rely on their (prospective) 
host and the offered apartment to be adequate and fulfill their needs. 
In all this, the platform provides not only the technical infrastructure, 
user interfaces, and process guidance but also services such as 
insurance and reputation systems, thus taking a pivotal role in 
establishing and maintaining trust among users.39 
Nobel Laureate Douglass North has argued in the past that institutions 
help to reduce the transaction costs associated with entering into business 
relationships.40 The more efficient an institutional environment, including the 
courts, legal system and law enforcement, the less burden on the parties to 
see their transaction through to its intended conclusion. However, even the 
                                                          
 38 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 91 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1651). 
 39 See Florian Hawlitschek, Benedikt Notheisen, & Timm Teubner, The limits of trust-
free systems: A literature review on blockchain technology and trust in the sharing economy, 
29 ELECTRONIC COM. RES. & APPLICATIONS 50, 50-51 (2018) (quoting Sundararajan Mazzella, 
A., D’Espous, V. & Möhlmann, M., How digital trust powers the sharing economy, IESE 
INSIGHT 24, 27 (2016)); see also Florian Hawlitschek, et al., Trust in the Sharing Economy: 
An Experimental Framework, 70 SWISS J. BUS. RES. & PRAC. 26 (2016). 
 40 Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 97 (1991). 
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most efficient institutions do not eliminate transaction costs. Moreover, not 
all institutional environments are created the same. Many developing 
countries (and some developed countries) are bound to weak institutional 
environments that provide little or no reasonable protection for parties to a 
business transaction, leaving the parties to rely upon relational trust, 
reputation, and informal means of protection for their transaction. Informal 
contract enforcement and dispute resolution can be very effective; however, 
informal mechanisms impose significant limitations on the environment 
within which transactions occur. 41 
Parties enter into contracts when they can be ensured that their 
commitments will be legally enforced. This enforcement historically 
occurred through informal mechanisms, such as guilds and similar merchant 
organizations. The rise of institutions, such as courts and law enforcement, 
enabled trust-based transactions to take place beyond small communities.42 
And today, powerful domestic institutions in many parts of the world, along 
with international institutions such as the World Trade Organization, enable 
global transactions between unrelated parties to occur in an environment of 
trust.43 However, in an institutional environment in which trust in those 
institutions is low, parties may be significantly less likely to engage in 
transactions with unrelated parties due to the increased risk of non-
enforcement. “An inherent constraint on traditional contracting is that the 
parties must trust the state, and a variety of private intermediaries that 
facilitate efficient operation of the system.”44 In those environments in which 
the level of trust in the state is low, parties often resort to informal 
mechanisms, which, as noted above, constrain their opportunities to operate 
outside of their relational trust environment. 
The constraints imposed by an informal institutional environment have 
been linked to slower overall economic growth.45 Parties that cannot easily 
operate outside of their relational trust circle, due to concerns over the risk 
associated with doing so, may pass up otherwise lucrative growth 
opportunities. The risk mitigation provided by effective, formal institutions 
                                                          
 41 See Michael Trebilcock & Jing Leng, The Role of Formal Contract Law and 
Enforcement in Economic Development, 92 VA. L. REV. 1517, 1519, 1522 (2006) (discussing 
the challenges in enforcing contracts outside the traditional legal system). 
 42 See generally Leon Trakman, From the Medieval Law Merchant to E-Merchant Law, 
53 U. TORONTO L. J. 265 (2003). 
 43 See, e.g., World Trade Organization, ICC-WTO Small Business Champions, 
https://www.wto.org/english/ forums_e/business_e/sbc_e.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2020) 
(highlighting one of the WTO initiatives targeting increasing participation by small businesses 
in international trade). 
 44 Kevin Werbach & Nicholas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 330 
(Nov. 2017). 
 45 Douglass C. North, Institutions and Growth, in JEFFRY A. FRIEDEN & DAVID A. LAKE, 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL POWER AND WEALTH 47-59 
(2000) (describing from a historical perspective the central role played by institutions in 
fostering economic growth). 
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opens the door to non-relational business transactions, essentially inserting a 
trust element into a transaction with significant trust-related risks. 
Until now, parties in low-trust environments caused by ineffective 
institutions have had little choice but to depend on informal institutions as a 
means to facilitate their business transactions. Reform of those institutions 
has been an intense effort by a number of multilateral and nonprofit 
organizations for the past few decades.46 Yet, little progress has been made 
in this effort. Technology may offer a solution in the form of blockchain. 
Rather than replicating the traditional structure of institutions in a more 
advanced manner, blockchain appears to be modernizing the historical trust 
environment in which a community of disinterested yet trusted parties could 
be counted upon to provide the foundations of trust for a given transaction. 
The next section will explain the fundamentals of blockchain and how it may 
fit into the broader trust environment of business transactions. 
B. Blockchain 
A blockchain is an electronic distributed ledger that utilizes multiple 
computers to verify and record transactions without the possibility for 
modification. Or, in a simpler sense, it is a means to permanently and 
unalterably record a transaction. These transactions might be purchases of 
goods using Bitcoin, whereby the use of the Bitcoin is permanently and 
unalterably recorded so that the spent Bitcoin cannot be reused; or they may 
be completion of a performance element of a contract, whereby the 
beneficiary of that performance cannot withhold their resulting obligations 
as the record of performance has been made. 
The concept of blockchain originated with a white paper written by 
Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008, which largely focused on Bitcoin.47 Mr. 
Nakamoto’s paper suggested that technology had the ability to substitute for 
institutions the trust elements of certain types of transactions.48 This new 
technology was first debuted in 2009 with the advent of Bitcoin, the first 
electronic currency not tied to any institution but linked only to blockchain 
technology. 
Bitcoin (and blockchain generally) operates with a number of nodes, 
which are computers connected to a network.49 These nodes operate together 
to verify the users on the network and the validity of the transactions. This is 
accomplished by first verifying the users attempting to engage in a 
                                                          
 46 See, e.g., Justice and Development, WORLD BANK, https://www.worldbank.org/en/
topic/governance/brief/justice-rights-and-public-safety (highlighting several law and justice 
initiatives of the World Bank). 
 47 Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (2008), https://
bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Tara Mandjee, Bitcoin, its Legal Classification and its Regulatory Framework, 15 J. 
BUS. & SEC. L. 157, 161–62 (2015) (defining Bitcoin and its role as a new currency). 
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transaction, for instance, buying and selling Bitcoins. A public and private 
user key is utilized to create a digital signature certifying that the users are 
who they say they are.50 Then, the nodes review the ledger associated with 
the users and the Bitcoins in their transaction to confirm that they are 
legitimate and available for transactions. Assuming the users and the 
transaction are properly verified, the transaction proceeds and the changes 
are immediately recorded in the ledger—the blockchain—to ensure that 
further transactions occur on the basis of what has been recorded in that 
ledger. 
The opportunity for fraud and cheating in a system like this seems 
rampant. However, the system was cleverly designed to integrate protections 
that largely eliminate the risk of fraud. In order for a node to validate (or 
invalidate) a transaction within the network, that computer must solve a 
complex mathematical problem that requires immense guessing; however, 
the mathematical problem is so complex that it would take a single computer 
years to solve.51 Thus, to change or validate the transaction, each node must 
work with other nodes in the network to answer the problem collectively.52 
Once the problem is solved by one of the nodes, that computer must share its 
“proof of work” with other computers on the network to verify its problem-
solving. This means that a potential hacker or fraudster would have to 
compromise seemingly innumerable computers in order to potentially pass 
off fraudulent data.53 
Blockchain is seen to possess five key elements that make it a good 
substitute for institutions in business transactions: 1) consensus, 2) validity, 
3) uniqueness, 4) immutability, and 5) authenticity.54 Note that these key 
elements are labeled differently, but function the same way, throughout the 
blockchain literature.55 
Consensus refers to the community of users in the blockchain network 
that verify the validity of transactions. Miners are users that actively attempt 
to solve the complex mathematical problems described above in order to earn 
                                                          
 50 Id. at 162. 
 51 Jesse Marks, Distributed Ledger Technologies and Corruption the Killer App?, 20 
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 42, 48–49 (2018). 
 52 Note that the incentive for a particular node to engage in the mathematical problem-
solving is to earn Bitcoins as a reward. This is a practice known as mining Bitcoins. See, e.g., 
Mike Orcutt, How Secure is Blockchain Really?, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Apr. 25, 2018), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610836/how-secure-is-blockchain-really/. 
 53 Marks supra note 51, at 47–48. 
 54 Richard Gendal Brown, Introducing R3 Corda™: A Distributed Ledger Designed for 
Financial Services (Apr. 5, 2016), https://gendal.me/2016/04/05/introducing-r3-corda-a-
distributed-ledger-designed-for-financial-services/. 
 55 See, e.g., Scott A. McKinney, Rachel Landy & Rachel Wilka, Smart Contracts, 
Blockchain, and the Next Frontier of Transactional Law, 13 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 313, 
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decentralization). 
Can Smart Contracts Enhance Firm Efficiency? 
40:333 (2020) 
347 
Bitcoins as a reward for their efforts.56 Once they solve a problem, they must 
share their proof of work with the other users on the network, who in turn 
validate their entries. If validated, a new block is created within the ledger 
for the validated transaction and that block is copied to every other computer 
on the network, giving all users copies of the updated ledger.57 
Validity is one of the key elements that I will discuss in the context of 
smart contracts. In essence, validity refers to the immediate clearance of a 
transaction due to the presumed immutability of the blockchain along which 
it occurred and the validation of the users and their accounts.58 Validity 
occurs through the automation of certain transactional elements, such as the 
automatic distribution of funds once a certain performance is completed, or 
the release of goods once payment has been verified. 
Uniqueness refers to the built-in protocol that prevents someone from 
making the same transaction using the same funds or data element twice. In 
other words, the system design prevents a user from repeating the same 
transaction, such as by spending the same Bitcoin twice. In order to clear a 
transaction, at least half of the nodes in the network must validate the 
transaction. An attempt by a user to re-spend a Bitcoin would be rejected by 
those nodes because those nodes would see that the previously completed 
transaction in the blockchain has already been copied to their ledgers.59 
Immutability refers to the inability of a user to change a past transaction 
without substantial effort and verification. This feature is achieved through a 
combination of two parts of the blockchain process: hashes and the consensus 
protocol.60 The hash is a unique fingerprint assigned to the miner that 
successfully solves the mathematical problem required to create a block for 
the verified transaction. That hash is unique to the user and transaction. 
Altering the block would require the generation of a new hash that requires 
completion, once again, of a new mathematical challenge. If that were 
achieved, the user would then have to create a new hash for all subsequent 
transactions (blocks) along the same ledger (chain). Any conflicting 
information would lead to immediate rejection of the change by the 
computers along the node, each of which maintains a copy of the previously 
verified blocks and their unique hashes. 
The final element in blockchain technology is authenticity. Every user 
in a blockchain transaction possesses both a public key and a private key—
codes that only the user has access to and that are linked together. The private 
key is used to create the encryption sequence embedded in the public key, 
and thus only the holder of the private key can decrypt a transaction 
                                                          
 56 See Orcutt, supra note 52. 
 57 See Marks, supra note 51, at 50–51. 
 58 Id. at 51–52. 
 59 Id. at 52. 
 60 See Orcutt, supra note 52. 
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containing that particular public key.61 This is accomplished through the 
creation of a digital signature, which every user must use to conduct 
transactions in the network. Of course, this is potentially problematic as users 
that lose their private key would no longer have access to the transactions 
along the blockchain and may lose ownership of the Bitcoins associated with 
the transaction.62 
These elements offer the promise of trust in the absence of institutions. 
The minimal risk of corruption or fraud, the substantial level of transparency, 
and the certainty of recordation make blockchain a viable alternative to a 
weak institutional environment for business transactions. Blockchain has the 
potential to remove the institutional element from the business environment 
without removing the efficiency and confidence those institutions are meant 
to provide. By doing so, transaction costs are largely reduced to zero since, 
in a smart contract transaction for instance, there are few, if any, costs 
associated with enforcement of the promises—all of which would be 
automated. 
With respect to business transactions, “[t]he law provides a source of 
confidence, not a guarantee, that a promise will be performed. If a promisor 
breaches a contract, the promisee does not magically receive the promised 
performance or even its monetary equivalent.”63 Blockchain appears to be a 
potential substitute for those institutions that might be used when the 
institutions fail. 
C. Smart Contracts 
Smart contracts are one of the technological possibilities that came into 
existence because of blockchain technology. The cryptographer Nick Szabo 
coined the term smart contract in 1996, which he defined as “a set of 
promises, specified in digital form, including protocols within which the 
parties perform on these promises.”64 For Szabo, the smart contract was made 
possible due to the Internet and increasing sophistication of computer 
processing abilities, which he believed, in time, would lead to a transition of 
contracts to a purely digitized environment. 
At the time of Szabo’s prediction, some elements of contracts had 
already been moving into the digital environment. Certain financial 
transactions, such as the auto-execution of securities purchases, were 
becoming more common, adding both efficiency and security to what had 
                                                          
 61 Jean Bacon et al., Blockchain Demystified: A Technical and Legal Introduction to 
Distributed and Centralised Ledgers, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 14 (2018). 
 62 See, e.g., Gregory Barber, A Crypto Exchange CEO Dies – With the Only Key to $137 
Million, WIRED (Feb. 5, 2019, 4:57 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/crypto-exchange-ceo-
dies-holding-only-key (describing the death of Canadian Gerry Cotton, who died without 
leaving behind his key to access the millions of dollars in Bitcoins that are now, presumably, 
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 63 Bellia, supra note 24, at 34. 
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been human-controlled (and thus subject to error) actions.65 Yet these pre-
blockchain smart contracts still relied substantially on human input and 
review to ensure that the technology was functioning as intended. 
When blockchain appeared on the scene, smart contracts were given a 
new persona as potentially independent transactions without the need for 
human input beyond the initiation of the transaction.66 A smart contract is “a 
set of promises, specified in digital form, including protocols within which 
the parties perform on those promises.”67 It is a contract that relies upon 
automation and code to make a traditional contractual transaction more 
efficient and secure. 
At its core, a smart contract is still a contract. In order for it to have legal 
effect and be enforceable in court, if necessary, the contract still requires all 
of the basic elements of offer, acceptance, intent, and, in common law 
jurisdictions, consideration.68 Yet the verification that the contract was 
properly formed and that performance was properly executed would not take 
place through negotiation, arbitration or judicial intervention; rather, it would 
take place automatically within the blockchain network. 
What turns a traditional contract into a smart contract is automation, or 
in programmatic language, “if/then” conditions built into computer code. A 
simple smart contract might include a term that will release the lien on a piece 
of property automatically once payment has been processed. It might release 
funds held in escrow once goods have been received by a shipper. It may 
facilitate a judge-less execution of a will.69 It may allow for two parties to 
negotiate the lease of a car using automated interactions based upon 
predefined conditions set by the parties, giving a whole new meaning to 
haggling.70 Or it might terminate a contract once a key deadline has passed 
without expected performance logged. In each of these scenarios, computers 
are used to execute conditional clauses in a contract once the conditions have 
been satisfied (or once a performance deadline has passed)—a rather 
simplistic function given the complexity of computers today.71 
Practically speaking, while traditional contracts are created on paper or 
something similar, smart contracts must be created via computer code. The 
                                                          
 65 See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 44, at 320–23 (describing Professor Harry Surden’s 
explanation of the evolution of digitized contracts). 
 66 McKinney et al., supra note 55, at 321–22. 
 67 Szabo supra note 64. 
 68 McKinney et al., supra note 55, at 322–23. 
 69 Etienne Dusseault, Introduction to Solidity Programming and Smart Contracts (For 
Complete Beginners), MEDIUM (Aug. 4, 2018), https://medium.com/coinmonks/introduction-
to-solidity-programming-and-smart-contracts-for-complete-beginners-
eb46472058cf (providing a crude example of the execution of a “smart will”). 
 70 Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 
263, 273–74 (2017). 
 71 See McKinney et al., supra note 55, at 323–25 (explaining the limited usage of smart 
contracts in 2018). 
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debate about the distinction of the two forms is beyond the scope of this 
article.72 What is of importance to this fundamental examination of smart 
contracts is how they might provide an alternative to traditional legal 
institutions, thus offering a tool to facilitate business transactions with trust 
built into the code of the contract. The use of smart contracts to replace 
traditional contracts has the power to potentially eliminate the need for 
institutional support, from interpretation to enforcement of promises.73 
Most smart contracts drafted as of the date of this article are created 
using a programming language known as Solidity.74 This is one of four major 
programming languages used in blockchain.75 Solidity was created in 2014 
by developers at Ethereum.76 Ethereum is a blockchain platform created in 
2014 by a Swiss nonprofit known as the Ethereum Foundation.77 Its asserted 
function is to operate as “a decentralized platform that runs smart contracts: 
applications that run exactly as programmed without any possibility of 
downtime, censorship, fraud or third-party interference.”78 Solidity is one of 
the key languages used to program smart contracts on the Ethereum platform. 
Smart contracts offer a number of advantages over traditional contracts. 
First, they obviate the need for judicial intervention to determine whether a 
valid contract has been formed and what it consists of. There would be no 
more need for a parole evidence rule, or challenges to the mutual assent of 
the parties as the smart contract would not allow performance to begin unless, 
and until, all of the relevant formation factors had been accounted for and 
satisfied.79 Disputes over whether parties actually agreed to given terms 
would be avoided. Of course, it would no longer be possible for verbal 
contracts to come into existence in the smart contract context either. 
Second, much of the security provided during traditional contract 
negotiations through representations and warranties would be rendered 
                                                          
 72 For more information about the formation of smart contracts, see generally Smart 
Contracts & Legal Enforceability, CARDOZO BLOCKCHAIN PROJECT REPORT #2 (Oct. 2018), 
https://cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/2020-01/smart_ contracts_report_2_0.pdf. 
 73 See, e.g., Alexander Savelyev, Contract Law 2.0: “Smart” Contracts as the Beginning 
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 74 Introduction to Smart Contracts, SOLIDITY, https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.5.6/
introduction-to-smart-contracts.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2020). 
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of 1933 and a Proposal for New Regulation, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 405, 408–10 (2018) 
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unnecessary with a smart contract.80 Those traditional statements protect a 
party in the event that their counterparty lied or withheld information relevant 
to the agreement.81 For instance, if a party misstated their financial liquidity, 
a representation would protect the other party in the event of bankruptcy. A 
smart contract avoids the need for such protections as conditional 
performance language can be written into the code, triggering certain 
outcomes in the event of party misstatements, such as transferring funds 
automatically in the event of a default. 
Third, and quite significant in terms of the forthcoming discussion about 
smart contracts in developing countries, the enforcement provisions built into 
smart contracts offer a superior remedy for parties to a dispute.82 The key 
here is automation. Rather than having to draft a choice of law and choice of 
forum clause in a contract, or relying on conventions such as the Uniform 
Commercial Code or the Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 
parties to a smart contract enjoy the benefits of strict compliance with the 
stated performance obligations in the agreement.83 If the performance 
obligations are not met, a trigger is executed by which the non-breaching 
party is made whole.84 For instance, if a party failed to deliver the requested 
goods on time, payment, which may have been held in escrow, is returned to 
the buyer and, if deposits were made for liquidated damages, the buyer may 
receive access to those funds as well, all without the need to involve 
arbitrators or the courts. 
A key element that readers should understand about smart contracts is 
that they exist in a pre-determined environment with conditions established 
ex-ante, meaning that the work going into a contract to ensure that it is 
accurate and precise is likely more extensive than that of a traditional 
contract, which may count on negotiation and favorable interpretation post-
execution.85 Likewise, the risk of default is much greater in a smart contract 
given the automated enforcement provisions and lack of flexibility in 
interpreting party intent for their actions. 
The inflexibility in a smart contract is the result of technological 
limitations. As of this writing, a smart contract cannot be designed to 
interpret common traditional contract terms such as “best efforts” or 
                                                          
 80 Id. at 328–29. 
 81 See, e.g., Tina Stark, Nonbinding Opinion, 15 BUS. L. TODAY 3 (2006) (discussing the 
remedies available at common law for misrepresenting a statement of fact). 
 82 Werbach & Cornell, supra note 44, at 331–32 (explaining that smart contracts provide 
a more secure mechanism for enforcement in the form of automation); but see McKinney, 
supra note 55, at 330–40 (describing potential enforcement problems, such as a party closing 
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 83 But see Sklaroff, supra note 70, at 277 (suggesting that parties tied to an inflexible 
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 84 McKinney et al., supra note 55, at 330. 
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“commercially reasonably efforts.”86 However, new advances in artificial 
intelligence may pave the way for more complex interpretive abilities in 
computers and, thus, a more expansive application of smart contracts in the 
future.87 
Of course, numerous problems exist with these purported benefits.88 
Smart contracts, as they exist today, can operate only in a very limited range 
of agreements, all of which involve “if/then” triggers as opposed to complex 
obligations. Smart contracts still require human input to develop the code that 
will be executed in the blockchain environment. And smart contracts remain 
quite inflexible, offering no room for interpretation, waiver, or modification 
once a contract has been executed.89 Yet despite these (and other) problems, 
smart contracts have the potential to evolve into powerful tools that enable 
users to operate in a trust-oriented environment built without legal 
institutions. 
IV. CAN BLOCKCHAIN ENHANCE GROWTH IN EMERGING 
MARKETS? 
Economic growth in developing country markets typically trends 
behind that found in developed economies. Instability, corruption, and a 
variety of environmental and political factors play a role in holding some of 
these countries back. However, development economists have long found 
that one of the most effective targets for reform to promote growth in these 
countries is the strengthening of their institutional environments.90 And while 
they have been cautious to credit legal reform in particular with sparking 
economic growth, they have agreed broadly that effective institutions enable 
an environment of trust that facilitates business.91 
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Emerging markets in many instances function within weak institutional 
environments, either due to bureaucratic inefficiency or corruption.92 
Consumers and businesses rely less on courts and law enforcement to protect 
their promises than they might in developed countries that enjoy a more 
efficient institutional environment. Reforming the institutions within 
developing countries has been a goal of economic development programs for 
many years, yet success has been elusive.93 
Institutional change is a slow-moving process that usually involves 
small adjustments rather than complete redevelopment.94 “Rather than 
abruptly dismantling the rules, then, actors slowly subvert, build around, or 
redirect them.”95 Aside from the occasional coup d’état that effectively 
revamps complete institutional environments, such as what we witnessed in 
Chile during the Pinochet years,96 ineffective institutions remain ineffective 
in spite of efforts to change them. 
Is blockchain the answer? As discussed above, blockchain has the 
potential to remove the need for formal institutions to facilitate trust and see 
promises through to their intended conclusions.97 Could smart contracts then 
substitute for an efficient institutional structure in emerging markets, 
sparking the economic growth that has been held back within the weak 
institutional environment? Or will they always be an alternative to traditional 
contracts but never a replacement?98 
The centralized system of institutions that has driven economic 
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 97 Werbach & Cornell, supra note 44, at 325 (describing the inherent trust built into 
Bitcoin transactions within the blockchain). 
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in that they rely not on contract law but on code crafted by the parties, and thus provide 
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development through widespread and long-distance contractual transactions 
has proven to be largely ineffective in many developing markets. Smart 
contracts executed within the blockchain environment provide a 
decentralized ledger system that builds trust into each element of each 
transaction without the need for a central authority to confirm its validity.99 
The distributed ledger system effectively engages a community of 
participants in the validation of each contract transaction by building its 
elements along the blockchain and simultaneously replicating those elements 
across the entire network to prevent alteration.100 
The potential applications of blockchain and smart contracts to create a 
trust environment in the absence of effective institutions is endless.101 At its 
most basic level of application, smart contracts could be used for financial 
instruments, such as loans, that require certain pre-conditions, rate 
negotiation, and performance by both parties with little room for 
interpretation about that performance.102 Similarly, smart contracts could 
help with public goods such as utilities or tolls, providing automated 
deductions from user accounts upon receipt of service, and clear and 
transparent conditions for when those deductions should occur and in what 
amount.103 These solutions would be especially useful in a developing 
country where lack of trust in the credit system leads to low levels of 
automation. But beyond the hypothetical world of the value of smart 
contracts in the developing country context, we can highlight a recent 
practical example of their application to property titles in Honduras. 
More than a decade ago, I wrote several articles describing the 
seemingly intractable problem of land titling in many developing countries 
where property titles are handed down through informal mechanisms, and 
formal registrations are infiltrated by corruption.104 The inspiration for this 
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research was the work of Hernando de Soto, who wrote extensively about the 
importance of transitioning informal landowners and informal business 
owners into the formal economy— legalizing their titles—in order to 
promote broader economic growth.105 And though his solution of 
government-led formalization drew criticism,106 the underlying tenet of 
providing a formal and immutable record of property titles remains valid and 
important in economic development. 
Of the 7.3 billion people in the world, only two billion have a title that 
is legal and effective and public regarding their control over an asset 
. . . When something is not legally on record as being owned, it can 
therefore not be used . . . as collateral to get credit, as a credential that 
you can be able to transfer part of your property to invite investment 
in. Things are owned, but when they’re not adequately paperized or 
recorded, they cannot fill the functions of creating capital and 
credit.107 
Property titles in Honduras, like in many countries, are maintained using 
paper records that are held by government offices (usually notarios). In 2017, 
roughly 80% of Honduran property was either untitled or improperly titled.108 
Coupled with a weak institutional environment, this left property holders in 
the delicate predicament of being challenged in their title to the land that they 
occupy, or threatened with occupation or violence in the absence of payment 
to what has been termed the “land mafia.”109 
Austin-based startup Factom proposed in 2015 to help Honduras by 
building a blockchain-based land registry to replace the existing paper-based 
system.110 According to the press release made when the company decided 
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to engage in this effort, they said of Honduras that “[t]he country’s database 
was basically hacked. So bureaucrats could get in there and they could get 
themselves beachfront properties.”111 Their goal was “putting all of the 
government’s land titles on the blockchain.”112 It was an ambitious but noble 
project to say the least. 
The basic idea was simple. All land titles would be relocated or created 
on a new peer-to-peer blockchain network whereby anyone who wanted 
access to the titles would have it.113 With a blockchain in place, registrations 
would have to be carefully entered to ensure accurate and complete records, 
knowing that changing a record (for legitimate or illegitimate reasons) would 
be nearly impossible. Transfers of land would be seamless, with titles open 
and obvious, and new registrants added to the blockchain without room for 
fraud. 
The Honduran experiment was a brilliant first step toward utilizing 
blockchain technology to resolve some of the developing world’s most 
corruption-laden, institution-based problems. However, we will never know 
if it would have worked because it was never implemented in Honduras.114 
The Honduran government never actually signed the agreement touted in the 
press, and it seems that they never intended to. Critics later suggested that 
Factom and similar blockchain supporters often miss the complexity of 
developing country politics: “[b]y assuming the problem is mainly about 
bureaucratic inefficiencies and paper-based processes, Bitcoin enthusiasts 
ignore the hardest part of the situation: long-standing conflicts over rights 
and power.”115 
Subsequent to this failed experiment, other governments have begun 
looking for ways to implement blockchain technology and Bitcoins to help 
secure administrative processes, such as property titling.116 Some have 
successfully implemented blockchain titles, including the small town of 
South Burlington, Vermont,117 which, working with a startup company 
known as Propy, transitioned their property deeds to the Ethereum 
                                                          
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Marks, supra note 51, at 67 (explaining the Factom CEO’s goal of leapfrogging archaic 
paper-based titling systems in other parts of the world). 
 114 Id. at 68. 
 115 Chelsea Barabas & Ethan Zuckerman, Can Bitcoin Be Used For Good?, THE ATLANTIC 
(Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/Bitcoin-
hype/477141/. 
 116 Laura Shin, Republic of Georgia to Pilot Land Titling on Blockchain with Economist 
Hernando De Soto, BitFury, FORBES (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/
2016/04/21/republic-of-georgia-to-pilot-land-titling-on-blockchain-with-economist-
hernando-de-soto-bitfury/#5ba9f8444da3 (explaining that Georgia, Sweden, Honduras and 
the City of Chicago have begun implementing this technology into government-related 
transactions). 
 117 Here’s What a Blockchain Property Deed Looks Like, GOVTECH BIZ, (Apr. 16, 2018), 
https://www.govtech.com/ biz/Heres-What-a-Blockchain-Property-Deed-Looks-Like.html. 
Can Smart Contracts Enhance Firm Efficiency? 
40:333 (2020) 
357 
blockchain.118 Similarly, the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) is applying blockchain and smart contracts to facilitate property 
titling in India as part of a pilot project meant to avoid many of the same 
problems faced in Honduras and other developing countries.119 Several other 
initiatives have been attempted in countries from Japan to Sweden.120 
These experiments in applying blockchain and smart contracts to 
difficult contractual scenarios in developing countries reflect two things: (1) 
a realization that institutional reform is either too slow or too cumbersome to 
resolve these issues; and, (2) an understanding that this technology is quickly 
evolving and shows substantial promise in more effectively resolving these 
issues than traditional means. This is not to say that there will not be 
significant difficulties in creating a world that operates to some degree along 
a blockchain rather than a traditional, human-controlled institution. I discuss 
a few of these potential problems below. 
A. Adoption 
The fact that blockchain exists as an option for buyers and sellers does 
not mean that they would utilize it in lieu of alternative methods. Change 
always comes at a cost. This is especially true in more traditional societies in 
which community practices are deeply embedded in the societal norms. This 
has been frequently seen in experiments involving the introduction of more 
productive mechanisms or approaches in a variety of contexts, a concept 
known as bounded rationality. 
The term “bounded rationality,” coined by Herbert A. Simon in 1957, 
suggests that individuals make sub-optimal choices due to limited 
information as well as environmental factors that influence their decision-
making (such as friends and family).121 This theory has been used to explain 
many seemingly irrational failures to adopt new techniques that would be 
more productive, from cacao farming techniques in Cote d’Ivoire122 to 
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spending decisions in India.123 
We have already seen in the failed Honduras experiment that 
governments may have cause to be hesitant in adopting blockchain and smart 
contract technology. Similar to an individual’s hesitation to abandon past 
traditions, the bureaucrats’ rationale for rejecting adoption of this technology 
is likely to be deeply rooted in corruption, which has historically provided 
them with undeserved benefits.124 And though the current institutional 
architecture is inefficient and ripe with problems, abandoning that system for 
an untested and seemingly ethereal promise of efficiency and transparency is 
a big risk. 
What may be needed to overcome this fear is an incentive. Cass 
Sunstein and Richard Thaler provide one possibility in their book, Nudge, 
which suggests that human behavior falls into certain routines that, once 
established, are exceedingly difficult to change.125 Their argument is that 
people make choices based on the desire to have control over those choices, 
and when they are given a “choice architecture” that provides them with 
desirable options and makes them believe that they are in control of their 
decision-making, they tend to choose those options. 
In the case of adopting blockchain and smart contract technology, useful 
incentives may come from a variety of sources, such as successful 
implementation in peer-countries; a desire to be the first-mover among a 
given community of countries; or broader international incentives, such as 
membership in elite organizations like the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD).126 Internally, parties may be more 
inclined to adopt this technology if they see it in operation amongst their 
peers, which may be the result of cross-border contracts in which their 
counterparts in other parts of the world utilize smart contract provisions. 
B. Trust and Technology 
The degree to which a user might utilize blockchain to facilitate a 
business transaction is largely related to their familiarity with technology in 
general and their willingness to trust that technology. This would suggest that 
more tech-savvy individuals could become early adopters of blockchain for 
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business, but their ability to rely on that technology is largely dependent upon 
the technical expertise and trust of the counterparty to the arrangement. 
Bitcoin is an example of blockchain technology, and its adoption by some 
merchants, though certainly not a majority, reflects the gradual growth of 
trust in the technology.127 
Accepting Bitcoin as a means to transact business is utilized as an 
alternative to existing currencies and other technologies, such as Apple Pay. 
When a merchant chooses to accept Bitcoin for payment, they are hedging 
their risk by maintaining a number of different payment options. Most of 
these companies see Bitcoin as a very small aspect of their currency 
portfolios. Because Bitcoin is not seeking to replace the existence of 
traditional currency, it is not seen as a threat to business or governance. 128 
The use of smart contracts has a potentially larger effect on the 
institutional environment than Bitcoin. Smart contracts purportedly eliminate 
the need for courts, judges, arbitrators, and even lawyers in crafting, 
interpreting, and enforcing a contract. In the distant future, with artificial 
intelligence far more advanced than it is today, the possibility of the key 
business document—the contract—replacing the entire institutional 
apparatus built around it seems surprisingly possible.129 This would forever 
shift the institutional environment, reducing the importance of the judge as 
the purveyor of contractual interpretation and replacing him or her with pre-
determined code that would seemingly evolve to take into account mounds 
of data from precedent, best practices, industry standards, and so forth. The 
potential for an omnipotent interpreter in the form of a computer program 
could well be on the horizon. 
Yet none of this theoretical world of the future will change the 
underlying mistrust that humans were embedded within their own genetic 
code: “the need for trust will not be obliterated but rather shifts from central 
authorities towards algorithms that govern users’ interactions.”130 The advent 
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of machines to replace humans has caused uproar and revolution throughout 
history, yet these instances have largely related to physical substitution rather 
than mental. More recently, the application of technology to replace human 
thought processes has brought with it a more existential debate about whether 
we trust machines as decision-makers and interpreters of human actions.131 
Scientists working in this area urge citizens to remain calm and not to fear a 
fundamental shift in control from humans to computers, and emphasize that 
regulation and other efforts to cease development in AI is likely to drive 
research underground into a much more dangerous environment.132 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Smart contracts will not replace traditional contracts or the need to 
encourage effective institutional environments.133 A host of elements arise 
out of traditional contract processes, from assessing defenses to enforcement 
(e.g., unconscionability) to deciphering the validity of the contract formation 
in the first instance (e.g., duress).134 
The distributed ledger technology (DLT) that is at the heart of 
blockchain and smart contracts has tremendous potential to lend efficiency, 
fairness, transparency, and trust to our interactions with others. The openness 
and transparency alone provide an opportunity to overcome bureaucratic 
inefficiency and corruption by shining a bright light on the actions of 
government officials, corporations, and individuals, disincentivizing bad 
behavior.135 Similarly, locking-in those transactions through a blockchain-
approach ensures that people are true to their word (or actions) and cannot 
renege on their “smart” promises.136 
The technology apparent in smart contracts today may seem more of a 
novelty than a true revolution in contracting.137 After all, parties are still 
drafting terms in the form of programming code; humans are still negotiating 
conditions so as to instruct the computers to execute actions on the basis of 
those conditions; and parties still need to provide the funds (i.e., Bitcoins) 
and assets called for by the contract. Are they truly smarter than traditional 
contracts? Some authors have argued that smart contracts are simply 
upgrades to the existing contract landscape and offer nothing more than 
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What I intended to do in this short article is to introduce the foundational 
question of whether blockchain technology offers a reasonable alternative to 
institutional reform for both simple and complex contractual transactions, 
especially in emerging markets. Technology has made our cities smarter with 
smart grids, meters, tolls, and so forth. It has made our health better with big 
data analysis, robotic surgery, and early detection systems. Will it make 
global business smarter by breaking down one of the key barriers to trade 
between unrelated parties—trust? If it does, will this stimulate economic 
growth in emerging markets, or will political intervention slow the train of 
progress? These are key questions that we need to be asking. 
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